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ABSTRACT

In each Canadian province, governments appear to be more and more intrusive into the day-to-day operations of their universities. Governments in such provinces as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Alberta are concerned with making the universities more cost-effective and more "accountable" to the government and to the public at large. Interventions by government into Ontario's provincial system of higher education escalated when the provincial legislature authorized the Provincial Auditor's Office to examine the financial records of three Ontario universities. The audits resulted in establishment of a Task Force on University Accountability, which issued 47 recommendations intended to make universities more accountable. The provincial government also became involved in negotiating reductions in salaries, wages, and benefits for university and college employees and has implemented several initiatives which have swept up universities along with other institutions. Governments' attempts to make universities more accountable can be viewed as a form of conflict among various elite groups within those institutions and within society as a whole. A self-regulatory framework is proposed that would include graduate program quality appraisals and undergraduate program reviews, annual institutional accountability reports, and a system-wide performance indicators and outcomes report. (Contains 15 footnotes.) (JDD)

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THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE STATE IN CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES:

CAN UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY BE RECONCILED?

Discussion Series
- Issue 3 -

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THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE STATE IN CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES:

CAN UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY BE RECONCILED?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Developments in university-government relations in recent years in Canada follow a trend towards greater government influence over universities. In each Canadian province, governments appear to be more and more intrusive into the day-to-day operations of their universities. This paper includes an overview of developments in six Canadian provinces which are either in the midst of, or have recently completed, major reviews of their systems of higher education. In each case, the government has been concerned with making the universities more cost-effective and more "accountable" to the government and to the public at large. This paper also includes a detailed review of the interventions by government into the largest provincial system of higher education in the country, that of the province of Ontario, and draws some conclusions about the impetus for this intervention. It also outlines a self-regulatory framework for the future which, if adopted, will allow universities to act collectively in such a way as to preserve institutional autonomy and diversity while meeting the demand for greater accountability.

Looking closer at the individual, national systems, we find that there is a clear trend in favour of the decentralization of decision-making in countries which traditionally had a centralized system, while the Anglo-Saxon system is moving in the opposite direction.[1]

INTRODUCTION

Developments in university-government relations in recent years in Canada appear to follow the trend towards greater government influence over universities identified with Anglo-Saxon systems of higher education. All ten Canadian provinces, including the predominantly francophone province of Quebec, are experiencing centralizing pressures comparable to those in the rest of North America and much of the British Commonwealth. In each province, governments appear to be becoming more and more intrusive into the day-to-day operations of their universities.

Canada consists of ten provinces and two territories – the latter having no universities – and the governments of those provinces and territories have jurisdiction over all matters of education, including higher education. A majority of the provinces, including the largest province of Ontario – have binary systems of post-secondary education. That is, among institutions of higher education, universities are legally autonomous of their respective provincial governments and are quite separate and distinct from the community colleges. Normally, the colleges are more tightly controlled by their provincial governments and concentrate on short-term and more technical, vocationally-oriented, skills training. Virtually all Canadian universities, however, are quasi-public institutions in that they are heavily dependent on their provincial governments for financial support.

The role of the federal government is restricted to three major areas. First, it provides grants to the provincial governments to help finance post-secondary education costs. Since these consist of unconditional grants and tax points within an integrated federal-provincial income tax system, the federal government is able to exercise almost no control over how the provincial governments choose to spend these transferred funds. Second, the federal government makes

[1] Carin Berg, "University Autonomy and Quality Assurance," *Higher Education in Europe*, Vol. XVIII, No 3, 1993, page 24.

grants directly to individual faculty members to help support their research projects. These funds are disbursed by federal granting councils according to the merits of the research projects involved, although in recent years part of the councils' budgets have been allocated to "strategic" research areas of national interest. Third, the federal government makes grants and loans directly to some post-secondary education students to assist them in meeting the costs of their education.

It is, then, to provincial government-university relations that we must direct our attention.

REVIEWS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE PROVINCES

This paper begins with a brief overview of developments in six provinces which are either in the midst of, or have recently completed, major reviews of their systems of higher education.[2] In each case, it was the provincial government or a government agency or government-appointed commission which carried out this review. In each case, the government was concerned with making the universities more cost-effective and more "accountable" to the government and to the public at large.

On Canada's eastern coast, Nova Scotia has 13 degree-granting universities, even though the province is one of the country's smallest and, with fewer than one million people, one of the least populous. In 1985, a Royal Commission recommended that the number of institutions be rationalized and, in 1992, the Nova Scotia Council of Higher Education was directed to develop a plan to rationalize university education in the province. The Council is concentrating its examination on distance and continuing education programs, credit transfer, professional programs, graduate schools, the establishment of a common student application centre, and the establishment of a single software system to manage student and faculty information.

In February, 1994, a special review team reported to the Nova Scotia Council on Higher Education on teacher education in the province.[3] The review team recommended that the

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2 Robert Davidson and Luc Rainville, "Higher Education Under the Microscope," *University Affairs*, May 1993, page 16.

3 Nova Scotia, *Teacher Education in Nova Scotia: An Honourable Past, An Alternative Future*, A Report to the Nova Scotia Council on Higher Education, February 1994.

number of teacher education students enrolled in the province be cut in half and that, of the nine institutions offering teacher education courses, five such programs be eliminated. It also made a number of detailed recommendations about the organization and content of the remaining teacher education programs.

Also in the East, the government of New Brunswick received a report in 1993 from the Commission on Excellence in Education.[4] The Commission recommended the implementation of a common application and student information system, and the development of an income contingent student aid plan. It also recommended that each university develop its own performance measurements and report regularly on the results achieved. Further, it recommended that the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission develop and publish a full range of performance indicators for each institution.

In Western Canada, each of the three prairie provinces has conducted major reviews of their respective institutions. In Alberta, the provincial government is implementing major transfer payment cuts, in a truly draconian attempt to reduce government expenditures of all sorts and the province's universities have not been exempt. Recently, in March, 1994, the government of Alberta released a draft white paper which identifies four goals for adult learning in the province, one of which is to "ensure responsiveness and accountability to learners and taxpayers."[5]

Post-secondary institutions in Alberta are to be required to provide key indicators of their performance, including reports of enrolment levels, graduation rates, costs per student, measures of student satisfaction and employment outcomes. These are viewed as part "of an accountability framework for post-secondary institutions and programs with performance measures that focus on results."[6] Universities and colleges would be expected to consult more widely in their decision making, for example with students on tuition fee policy, and there would be an Adult Learning Forum to provide ongoing stakeholder input into program direction and development. The government also expects institutions to become more responsive to

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4 New Brunswick, *To Live and Learn: The Challenge of Education and Training*, Report of the Commission on Excellence in Education, 1993.

5 Alberta, *Adult Learning: Access Through Information*, Draft White Paper: An Agenda for Change, March 1994, page 7.

6 *Ibid.*, page 14.

economic conditions. Specifically, the government would favour programs which meet the learning needs of those who are disadvantaged in the labour market, provide alternative streams to labour market entry, and encourage increased private sector investment training.

In neighbouring Saskatchewan, the government-appointed University Program Review Panel released its final report early in 1993.[7] It adopted, as its fundamental premise, the notion that the price of autonomy is strengthened governance and demonstrable accountability. It examined possible duplication between the province's two universities and concluded that there was no justification for amalgamation of the two institutions or of their major programs. It did, however, recommend major changes in the area of governance of each university and the creation of an Advisory Council on University Education.

In Manitoba, a University Education Review Commission reported to the provincial government early in 1994.[8] The Commission was chaired by Duff Roblin, Conservative Premier of the province from 1958 until 1967 and a former federal Senator. Its report makes 41 major recommendations, many of which are aimed at requiring the universities to be more accountable to the government. For example, it recommends the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Post-Secondary Education and a Council on Post-Secondary Education. The latter would replace the existing Universities Grants Commission with a bureaucracy having a much broader mandate covering both the universities and the community colleges.

If the Commission's recommendations were to be implemented, post-secondary education in Manitoba would reflect a traditional hierarchy. At the top would be the provincial Premier and the Cabinet, who would review the decisions of the Cabinet Committee on Post-Secondary Education which, in turn, would effectively direct the work of the Council on Post-Secondary Education. That Council would exercise *de facto* control over the universities and community colleges in the province.

Recent developments in the most populous of the provinces, Ontario, in Central Canada, will serve as the focus for the remainder of this paper. Ontario's universities have been the subject of several major reviews by provincial government agencies and commissions during the past

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7 Saskatchewan, *Looking At Saskatchewan Universities: Programs, Governance, and Goals*, Report of the University Program Review Panel, March 1993.

8 Manitoba, *Post-Secondary Education in Manitoba: Doing Things Differently*, Report of the University Education Review Commission, December 1993.

two decades. As in the five other provinces, the main impetus has been the government's desire to make Ontario's universities more accountable, culminating in the full-scale examination of the allocation of provincial funds to the universities, now underway.

TRADITIONAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

The province of Ontario has 17 degree-granting universities which are financed for the most part by grants from the provincial government. There is also a college of art and a specialized institute for graduate studies in education. With the exception of Queen's University, which has a federal charter, each of these institutions was established by an act passed by the provincial legislature. Ontario is also home to a military college which is part of the federal government's Department of National Defence. In addition, there are 23 colleges of applied arts and technology which are legally agencies of the Crown, and are quite separate and distinct from the university sector.

Up to and including the last decade, the provincial government has exercised influence over the activities of Ontario's universities through a number of methods. First, it requires or expects the universities to provide an extensive array of information on their operations. Some of this information is specifically mandated by the government, for example, reports on enrolment numbers and capital expenditures. Some reporting is done by the universities themselves, voluntarily by inter-institutional agreement, on a province-wide basis.[9] For example, each year every university participates in the publication of an annual report of institutional revenues and expenditures. Some institutional reports are also made available to the government, including audited annual financial statements.

Second, the government established a so-called buffer body, the Ontario Council on University Affairs, to provide a mechanism for policy planning and coordination for the university system. Council advises the Minister of Education and Training on all matters of policy, including operating and capital funding, referred to it by the Minister, or arising from its own deliberations or from requests by the institutions. More recently, Council has taken on a number of regulatory

[9] Although the essential characteristics of Ontario's universities are their autonomy and diversity, they have created the Council of Ontario Universities to identify and exploit possibilities for system-wide action, including the collection, processing and analysis of systemic data, the delivery of common services, public communication and advocacy, and to assist its members in responding to the challenges to university autonomy and financial viability.

and administrative matters that have raised questions about its "independence" from the Ministry. Members of the Council are appointed by the provincial government from nominations from various stakeholders, including the universities.

Third, the provincial government distributes its operating grants to the universities by way of a rather complex funding formula. For the universities, the formula has the advantage of distributing funding in an essentially unconditional manner. Since this formula is enrolment driven, each university is required to report its student numbers as well as expenditures from the grants received. If the government wishes to exercise a greater influence over university behaviour, one option open to it is to alter the funding formula. Certainly, the "targeting" of operating funds has become a more and more common instrument of government policy. In the area of capital funding for building construction and renovations, the government's role is even more direct with grants made, in the final analysis, by the Minister and his or her bureaucracy.

Fourth, by means of this same formula, the provincial government can exercise almost total control over the level of tuition fees charged by the universities. In theoretical terms it is possible for the universities to charge higher or lower fees, but government regulations mean that higher fees will not result in any additional revenue to the institution. Lower fees will only reduce total revenues.

Fifth, the Premier of the province or the Minister responsible for the universities can intervene directly in their operations by encouraging them to follow certain procedures. In each case, institutional autonomy has to be observed, but the message can be relayed in writing or by face-to-face negotiation. Moral suasion has proven to be a significant force in the hands of a determined Minister and government.

THE IMPETUS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

In the larger context, politicians and civil servants across Canada for the last decade have been coming under ever more severe pressures to justify increasing government expenditures, increasing taxes and ballooning deficits. Governments at all three levels have been growing faster than the economy's ability to sustain their expenditures. Despite higher taxation, then, revenues have been unable to keep up with expenditures. The magnitude of the federal deficit has become a national scandal as both the Liberal and Conservative governments have, in turn, seemed unable to reduce or even control it.

In Canada, as elsewhere, governments have been looking for ways to reduce expenditures or, at least, to ensure that their funds are being well spent. With the election of a Liberal government at the provincial level in 1985, Ontario launched a more interventionist approach towards its universities. In 1985, 75% of university operating income and almost all of the government's operating grants were distributed by means of the funding formula. By 1993, only 60% of university operating income came through the funding formula. Much of the difference, representing 13% of total operating income, was allocated in the form of conditional grants from the government,[10] which distributed funds to the universities according to how well they met the government's prescribed program goals. An early example of these conditional grants was the library enhancement and student equipment fund, which encouraged universities to spend money on certain specified areas. In so doing, these grants exercised a direct influence on the budgetary priorities of universities. Now it was the government which was setting those priorities, rather than the universities.

INTERVENTION BY THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR

The provincial legislature became involved directly when its Standing Committee on Public Accounts authorized the Provincial Auditor to examine the financial records of three of the universities. In 1988, 1989 and 1990, acting under the authority of the Audit Act, staff of the Provincial Auditor's Office audited the books of a small, a medium-sized, and a large university. These audits, of Trent University, the University of Guelph, and the University of Toronto respectively, were viewed as desirable by government, even though each of these institutions was subject to annual financial audits by private, external firms. The Provincial Auditor examined the enrolment data submitted to the Ministry, asset management and control systems, purchasing and payment practices, controls over payroll, operating expenditures and sabbatical leaves, and general compliance with government policy and procedures covering transfer payments.

These provincial audits were carried out within a setting in which the Provincial Auditor was actively promoting the notion of value-for-money auditing. Comprehensive auditing or value-for-money auditing broadens the scope of a normal financial audit and purports to test the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of the expenditures being made. It invites the auditor to comment, not only on whether the funds were spent for the purpose they were intended, but

[10] Council of Ontario Universities, *Financial Report of Ontario Universities*, various years.

also on whether the original purpose was valid. In effect, it invites the auditor to inject his or her own values or biases into an assessment of the worth of the program.

The reports of the Provincial Auditor were reviewed in detail by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts and, in 1991, that Committee issued a series of recommendations. In response, the Minister of Colleges and Universities established a Task Force on University Accountability which reported in May of 1993. The Task Force was composed of 12 members of the university community and

> **was asked to explore existing accountability mechanisms for universities in Ontario and identify gaps and overlaps; to examine alternative approaches and practices in other sectors and jurisdictions; to address the issue of accountability of public sector institutions; to identify potential relative roles and responsibilities of government, the Ontario Council on University Affairs (OCUA) and university governing structures for the development, implementation and monitoring of systems which ensure and demonstrate university accountability; to identify models or types of accountability mechanisms for implementation in the university context, including measures to address the broad public accountability for the overall goals and objectives of universities, the financial accountability of universities to government, and organizational efficiency and effectiveness; to consider the degree to which these models/mechanisms for public accountability ought to be implemented across the university system, or might be adapted, where appropriate, to different institutional situations; to identify the costs which would be incurred by implementing the proposed framework; and to develop a strategy (including time frames) for implementation of the proposed framework.**[11]

The Task Force issued some 47 recommendations intended to make universities more accountable to the government and to the public at large. The Task Force also identified a set of principles which should provide a solid foundation for a system of accountability for universities. These included the need to reflect the nature of the institution being held accountable, which in the case of universities included the importance of their governing bodies, and of the principles of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. They also included the principle of "transparency", by which they meant that the business of universities should be readily understandable as well as open and accessible to public scrutiny. They concluded that

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[11] Ontario, *University Accountability: A Strengthened Framework*, Report of the Task Force on University Accountability, May 1993, page 16.

universities should be responsive to their stakeholders, which include the government, people within the university community, private donors, and the broader public. Each university also should be cost effective in their operations and should share some common elements with other universities. That is, the Task Force proposed that some common "benchmarks" be developed against which institutional performance could be measured in terms of how well each university is fulfilling its mandate.[12]

Since the Task Force reported, the Ontario university community has been heavily involved in the development of "performance indicators". In this case, the emphasis has not been on comparing one university against another, but rather on recognizing the unique nature of each institution in the province and providing data which will permit an objective assessment of how successful it has been in meeting its own self-selected goals. This discussion has been coloured by the publication, for three years in a row, of national rankings of universities by *Maclean's*, a popular national magazine. These rankings have received widespread publicity, but have been strongly criticized within the universities for a lack of reliability or validity.

OTHER INTRUSIONS BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

At the same time as the Provincial Auditor, the Committee on Public Accounts, and the Ministry of Colleges and Universities were intervening in the day-to-day operations of Ontario universities under the guise of furthering accountability, the government was taking other steps to strengthen its control over the province's universities.

In the financial area, the government announced an Expenditure Control Plan and a Social Contract to Protect Jobs and Services in 1993 which reduced government funding while increasing government intervention in a broad range of institutions, including universities and colleges. In addition to a major reduction in provincial grants to universities and colleges, the provincial government became involved in negotiating reductions in salaries, wages and benefits for employees of those institutions. The universities resisted province-wide bargaining, insisting on institutional autonomy in such matters, and overall were successful in maintaining this principle through their Social Contract negotiations.

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[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

There were also several government initiatives which were applied across the whole province, but which swept up universities along with other institutions. Pay equity, employment equity, amendments to workers' compensation legislation, and amendments to occupational health and safety legislation, are just a few examples.

Finally, some government initiatives seem to be aimed directly at the universities themselves. For example, in 1993 the Minister issued a framework regarding the prevention of harassment and discrimination in Ontario universities. This was viewed by many faculty members as a threat to academic freedom and was criticized vigorously. The government has also issued guidelines on the composition of university boards of governors.

Even the way in which the government has organized its own affairs has failed to acknowledge the autonomous position of Ontario's universities. Within the Ministry of Colleges and Universities, the staff involved with university matters were amalgamated with and generally subordinated to staff concerned with college matters. No sooner had that particular departmental reorganization been concluded early in 1993, but another, even more far-reaching one, was begun. It merged the staff of the department responsible for universities and colleges with the staff of the departments responsible for skills training and for elementary and secondary schools into one super-ministry called Education and Training. Immersed within the much larger agenda of the school system, university concerns are seen to be downgraded and the ability of universities to influence government decision-making somewhat weakened.

This past winter, the government initiated a major review of the funding formula. In response to enrolment projections showing a significant and consistent trend upwards in the demand for university admission,[13] and to calls for a greater stress on undergraduate teaching.[14] The government, then, has inserted itself into an examination of the priorities and workloads of university faculty. What faculty members do with their time, how hard they work, how many hours they work, and how much time they spend in teaching as compared with research or community service, all appear to be matters of concern to the government, and lamentably the

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[13] Frank T. Denton, Peter J. George, Peter C. Pineo, and Byron G. Spencer, "Changing Enrolment Patterns in Ontario Postsecondary Education: A Summary of the Findings," McMaster University, 1992, and Frank T. Denton, Christine H. Feaver and Byron G. Spencer "MOPSIE: A Model of Ontario Postsecondary Enrolment and Some Illustrative Projections," McMaster University, 1992.

[14] Stuart L. Smith, *Report*, Commission of Inquiry on Canadian University Education, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1991.

study may provide plenty of opportunities for further government intrusion into the academic goals and objectives of Ontario's universities.

POLITICS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Governments' attempts to make universities more accountable can be viewed as a form of conflict among various elite groups within those institutions and within society as a whole. It is most certainly not just a simple matter of society at large attempting to make its universities more open and more accountable. Nor is it just a case of seamless university communities fending off the advances of more and more intrusive governments. The protagonists are many on each side. Some approach the government or adduce public opinion as a whole for support in their struggle for greater accountability; others oppose any intrusions from external sources by calling on institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

Some of these elite conflicts are obvious. The politicians and the government bureaucrats versus senior administrators of universities is, perhaps, the most easily discernible. Within the political elite, conflicts will arise between the government and the opposition in the legislature and between the political executive, in the form of the Cabinet, and the legislative arm, in the form of the backbenchers in the legislature. On the university side, conflicts arise between the central administration, headed by the President, Principal or Rector, and the academic faculty, represented by the Senate or, more likely, by the faculty association or union.

The activities of the Public Accounts committee of the Ontario legislature may be seen as a microcosm of these conflicts. On the political side, the committee can always be used to criticize and embarrass the ruling party. This process is helped by the fact that the chair of the committee is always a member of the largest opposition party in the legislature. The committee can also be used by the legislature to criticize the executive arm of government, particularly the Minister responsible for universities and the public servants who work in that department. When a member of the committee from one of the opposition parties criticizes the universities for a lack of accountability, he or she is also criticizing the government party, the Cabinet, the particular Minister responsible for universities, and the department of government responsible for universities.

He or she is usually aided and abetted in this criticism by another group of public servants, the staff of the Office of the Provincial Auditor. Those staff, in turn, may use criticism of the

universities as a justification for their own roles. The more irresponsible the universities can be portrayed, the more reason there will be for an expanded role for the Provincial Auditor's staff and the greater will be the power and prestige of the Provincial Auditor's office. Management Board of Cabinet or the Treasury Board may become involved, either defending (externally) or criticizing (internally) the Minister and his or her department.

When representatives of the universities are called to appear before the Public Accounts committee, another set of dynamics comes into play. For example, a particular criticism may be echoed by the faculty association of a particular university. The Provincial Auditor, the Public Accounts committee, and the university's faculty all may level the same criticism at the university because of the way in which its central administration has behaved, for example in its financial management of the institution. The central administration may fall back on the legal authority and ultimate responsibility of the university's Board of Governors. In the final analysis, it may be that Board which bears the blame for any perceived wrong doing.

In quite another situation, the government may enter into the conflict between the faculty and the central administration in such a way as to strengthen the administration's position. For example, faculty remuneration and working conditions may be scrutinized more thoroughly if it is known that one or more arms of government are looking on. The plethora of task forces, committees, commissions, and the like on the government side may be used by university administrators to address their particular priorities. Faculty opposition to those priorities can be more easily diverted if administrations appear to have the support of government.

In most cases, none of this has very much to do with the wishes of the public at large. For the most part, these conflicts represent the activities of elite groups. When politicians or bureaucrats speak of accountability, they are almost always talking about universities being accountable to the political elite. When central administrators talk about accountability, they are most likely to be talking about accountability to the Board of Governors. The public at large, for the most part, stands apart from this discussion. Surveys have shown that they are reasonably happy with what is going on in universities in Canada. Even the students are mostly interested in obtaining a degree and finding a well-paying job.[15] Only a small minority enter into the

[15] D.W. Livingstone, D. Hart and L.E. Davie, *Public Attitudes Towards Education in Ontario 1992*, Ninth OISE Survey, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1993. This report is based on a survey of a representative random sample of 1,000 adults, 18 years of age and older, from across Ontario who were interviewed by the Gallup Canada polling agency in 1992. H.W. Arthurs, "Resolved: Canadian universities undervalue teaching," *CAUT Bulletin*, January 1994, page 15,

debate over accountability or, for that matter, show any interest at all in the administration of their university.

CONCLUSION

What of the future? In Ontario, the government's treatment of the recommendations of the Task Force on University Accountability, and the results of the funding review will be crucial next steps. Our preferred framework for accountability would be an enhanced self-regulatory process, which would include, *inter alia*, graduate program quality appraisals and undergraduate program reviews, annual institutional accountability reports issued by each university's Board of Governors aimed at measuring success in meeting institutional mission, and a system-wide performance indicators and outcomes measures report prepared under the auspices of the Council of Ontario Universities. These reports would all be released publicly, and would be subjected to periodic procedural audit by a process to be determined by the Minister of Education and Training and acceptable to the Provincial Auditor.

Only through the adoption of such a self-regulatory framework can institutional autonomy and diversity be preserved in Ontario in the face of existing financial and regulatory controls and threats of greater government intervention. Much depends ultimately on whether the government is determined to challenge the fundamental principles of autonomy and diversity on which our institutions are founded. If there ever was a sound reason for autonomous institutions to act collectively, the protection of university autonomy and diversity and academic freedom is that reason. These principles underlie both the past and future contributions of Ontario's universities to the advancement of knowledge, the education of our students, and the economic, social and cultural development of our province.

The other provinces in Canada are monitoring developments in Ontario closely. The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada keeps an effective watching brief on government-university relations in the provinces, and is now leading a national accountability initiative on performance indicators. But, in the end, it is in the provinces where the final battles between autonomy and accountability will be waged and won in Canada.

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reports that "Statistics Canada recently surveyed 140,000 individuals who had graduated from Canadian universities in 1990: 84.3 per cent were very satisfied with the quality of teaching; 15.2 per cent were somewhat or very dissatisfied; 84.9 per cent were satisfied or very satisfied with their access to faculty members; 14.9 per cent were not."

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